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Abstract
Antitrust authorities often argue that merchants cannot reasonably turn down pay-
ment cards and therefore must accept excessively high merchant discounts. The paper
attempts to shed light on this “must-take cards” view from two angles.
First, the paper gives some operational content to the notion of “must-take card”
through the “avoided-cost test” or “tourist test”: would the merchant want to refuse a
card payment when a non-repeat customer with enough cash in her pocket is about to
pay at the cash register? It analyzes its relevance as an indicator of excessive interchange
fees.
Second, it identifies four key sources of potential social biases in the payment card
systems’ determination of interchange fees: internalization by merchants of a fraction of
cardholder surplus, issuers’ per-transaction markup, merchant heterogeneity, and extent
of cardholder multi-homing. It compares the industry and social optima both in the short
term (fixed number of issuers) and the long term (in which issuer offerings and entry
respond to profitability).
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1 Introduction
In payment cards systems such as Visa or MasterCard, the interchange fee (IF) paid by
the merchant’s bank (the “acquirer”) to the cardholder’s bank (the “issuer”) allocates
the total cost of the payment service between the two users, cardholder and merchant.
In several regions of the world, competition authorities, banking regulators, and courts of
justice have recently considered, or even implemented, regulatory caps on interchange fees
that are based on issuers’ costs. The premise for these regulatory caps is that unregulated
IFs are set at unacceptably high levels. Merchants, the argument goes, accept to pay the
resulting high merchant discount because they are concerned that turning down cards
would impair their ability to attract customers; that is, cards are “must-take cards”
(Vickers 2005).1
However, there is no logical connection between this “must-take cards” argument and
the issuers’ cost benchmark used by regulators. The main objectives of this paper are
to analyze the validity of the argument and to derive policy implications for possible
regulatory intervention. To this purpose, the paper develops a model of the payment card
industry that is sufficiently rich to account for the complex effects of IFs on volumes of
card payments, banks’ profits, consumer welfare, and retail profits and prices, yet simple
enough to assess their regulation.
First, the paper validates the “must-take cards” argument by showing that retailers
may be willing to accept cards even if the fee they have to pay exceeds their convenience
benefit for card payments. This is because accepting cards increases the retailer’s quality
of service by offering to his customers an additional payment option. This property holds
whether retailers are perfect competitors, Hotelling-Lerner-Salop competitors or even local
monopolists. Thus it is not due to an hypothetical “prisonner’s dilemma” situation where
1In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading, following a multi-year investigation of MasterCard’s credit card
IFs, ruled that the multilateral setting of these IFs was anti-competitive. Similarly, under the pressure
of the European Commission, Visa International agreed in 2002 to reduce its cross-border interchange
fees on credit and debit transactions within the European Union. In its recent MasterCard decision
(December 2007), the Commission went further and ruled that MasterCard IFs should be set to zero
(“at par settlement”). In Australia, after the publication of an extensive study of debit and credit card
schemes in 2000, the Reserve Bank of Australia mandated in 2003 a sizeable reduction of credit-card
IFs. Other countries where similar decisions have been made (or are seriously considered) by courts
of justice, competition authorities or banking regulators include Israel, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and
the Netherlands. The regulation of IFs may operate less directly, as was the case in the 2003 WalMart
settlement in which MasterCard and Visa agreed to pay $3 billion to merchants and to stop tying their
credit and off-line debit cards (the merchants in particular complained that the IF on off-line debit was
too high).
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retailers would accept cards only to steal business from each other.
Second, the paper provides an alternative benchmark for regulatory intervention. This
benchmark is not based on issuers’ costs, but on the retailer’s avoided-cost when a cash
(or check) payment is replaced by a card payment. The empirical counterpart of this
benchmark, which we call the “tourist-test”, gives some operational content to the notion
of “must-take card”: would the merchant want to refuse a card payment when a non-
repeat customer with enough cash in her pocket is about to pay at the cash register? Put
differently, the merchant discount passes the tourist test if and only if accepting the card
does not increase the merchant’s operating costs. The paper analyzes the test’s relevance
as an indicator of excessive interchange fees. We show that, when issuers’ margin are
constant, the tourist test is an exact test of excessive interchange fees from the point of
view of short-term consumer surplus, and yields false positives if the criterion is social
welfare.
Third, the paper identifies four key sources of potential social biases in the payment
card associations’ determination of interchange fees: internalization by merchants of card-
holder surplus, issuers’ per-transaction markup, merchant heterogeneity, and extent of
cardholder multi-homing. It compares the industry and social optima both in the short
term (fixed number of issuers) and the long term (in which issuer offerings and issuer
entry respond to profitability).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 assesses the impact of the pricing of pay-
ment cards services on card acceptance decisions by merchants and card usage decisions
by consumers. It also introduces the avoided-cost benchmark and its empirical counter-
part, the tourist test. Section 3 investigates whether the interchange fees maximizing
short-term welfare and total user surplus (the latter equal to the former minus banks’
profits), respectively, meet the tourist test. Section 4 compares privately and socially
optimal interchange fees, first in the case of a monopoly platform, then when several
platforms compete. Section 5 performs the same exercise as Section 3 in the long term,
in which issuer entry and offerings respond to industry profitability (and so welfare and
total user surplus coincide). Section 6 shows that retailer heterogeneity makes the tourist
test more likely to produce false positives. Section 7 concludes.
Relation to the literature. The paper borrows from and extends a number of contributions
to the literatures on card payments and two-sided markets. It elaborates on previous the-
oretical analyses (surveyed in Rochet (2003)) of the impact of IFs, in particular Rochet
and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002), and Wright (2003a, 2003b, 2004). In particular,
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the idea that merchants may accept cost-increasing means of payment is drawn from our
earlier paper on card payments. Our analysis of merchant heterogeneity borrows from
Schmalensee (2002) and Wright (2004). Wright built on Schmalensee and showed how
the privately and socially optimal IFs depend on the elasticities on the two sides (mer-
chants, cardholders). He argued that there is no systematic bias between the IF chosen
by the association and the socially optimal IF. We also borrow from Wright the mod-
elling of cardholder demand, which is a bit simpler than our initial modelling: Wright
assumed that cardholders’ convenience benefit is drawn at the moment of purchase while
we presumed that cardholders differ systematically in the benefit that they derive from
card payments. While ex post (Wright) and ex ante (Rochet-Tirole) heterogeneity de-
liver broadly convergent results, ex ante heterogeneity makes merchants’ card acceptance
decisions strategic complements rather than independent.
Finally, there is also a sizeable, less formal literature (surveyed in Schmalensee (2003))
on the potential anticompetitive effects of IFs, in particular Carlton and Frankel (1995),
Evans and Schmalensee (1995), Frankel (1998), Chang and Evans (2000) and Balto
(2000).2
While these contributions have substantially influenced this paper, none emphasizes
the distinctions between the relevant measures of welfare (social welfare, total user surplus,
consumer surplus) and their horizon (short vs. long term) and relates them to the tourist
test, as we do. To the best of our knowledge, the literature has left largely unexplored
the role of issuer, acquirer and merchant margins (Section 3) and of entry into credit card
services (Section 5), and the link between the average merchant benefit and efficient IFs
(Section 6).
2 The model
2.1 Must-take cards
There is a continuum of consumers (of total mass normalized to one) with quasi-linear
preferences. They spend their income on a composite good or “cash good” taken as a
numeraire and on one unit of a “card good” sold by R retailers (being a “card good” means
that consumers can pay by card as long as merchants accept it. “Cash goods” include
2This literature also addresses important questions that are left aside in the present paper: the impact
of bans on merchant surcharges for cards, the redistributive issues involved in the subsidization of card
usage by cash users, and the governance of card networks.
4
leisure/work). The utility from purchasing the card good can differ across consumers, but
is large enough, so that the aggregate demand for the card good is constant and equal to
one.3 The unit cost of the card good for retailers is constant: it is denoted γ.
Consumers must decide which store to patronize. They know the stores’ price and
card acceptance policy before making this choice. Once in the store they must further
select a payment method (a card or an alternative payment method, say cash), provided
that the retailer indeed offers a choice among payment means. The benchmark model has
a single card payment system. We assume “price coherence”; that is, the retailers either
find it too costly or are not allowed to charge different prices for transactions settled by
card and by cash. Whenever a transaction between a consumer (buyer) and a retailer
(seller) is settled by card, the buyer pays transaction fee pB to his issuer and the seller
pays merchant discount pS to her acquirer. We allow pB to be negative, in which case
the cardholder receives a payment from his bank, in the form of interest-free period, cash
back bonuses or air miles awarded to the buyer every time he uses his card. There are no
annual fees and all consumers have a card.
The consumer’s convenience cost of paying by cash (also the convenience benefit of
using a card) is a random variable b˜B drawn from cumulative distribution function H:
H (bB) = Pr
(
b˜B ≤ bB
)
, (1)
We adopt the convention that the convenience cost for the buyer of a card payment is
0. The distribution of b˜B has density h (bB) = H
′ (bB) and a monotone hazard rate:
h (bB)
1−H (bB) is increasing. We assume that the consumer only observes the realization of
b˜B once in the store. Because the net benefit of paying by card is equal to the difference
b˜B − pB, a card payment is optimal for the consumer whenever b˜B ≥ pB. The proportion
of card payments at a store that takes cards is denoted DB (pB):
DB (pB) = Pr
(
b˜B ≥ pB
)
= 1−H (pB) . (2)
vB(pB) denotes the average net cardholder benefit per card payment:
vB (pB) ≡ E [bB − pB|bB ≥ pB]
=
∫ ∞
p
B
(bB − pB) dH (bB)∫ ∞
pB
dH (bB)
> 0.
3The analysis of the variant where the demand for the card good is elastic is provided in Appendix 6.
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From the monotone hazard rate property, vB is a decreasing function
4 of pB.
The merchant’s convenience benefit, bS, is assumed to be homogeneous in a first step.
We adopt a convention similar to that for cardholders: bS is the retailer’s cost of a cash
payment, while that for a card payment is normalized at 0.
In order to illustrate the “must-take cards” idea, we posit that retailers’ perceived
benefit of accepting the card is equal to the sum of their convenience benefit and of the
surplus the card brings to buyers:
Assumption 1. Retailers accept the card if and only if:
pS ≤ bS + vB(pB). (3)
Interestingly, this assumption is satisfied in three important cases:
Proposition 1. Assumption 1 is satisfied under monopoly retailing, under perfect retail
competition, and under Hotelling-Lerner-Salop differentiated products competition.
Proof of Proposition 1: Monopoly retailer : Because retail demand is inelastic, the retail
monopolist leaves no surplus to consumers. Accepting cards increases her per transaction
cost by (pS− bS) but allows her to increase her price by vB(pB). Thus a retail monopolist
accept cards if and only if pS ≤ bS + vB(pB).
Perfectly competitive retailer : Perfectly competitive retailers charge a retail price equal
to their marginal cost, namely p = γ (the cost of the good) if they reject cards, and
p = γ+(pS − bS)DB(pB) if they accept them. Consumers choose the retailers who accept
cards if and only if their increased convenience benefit vB(pB)DB(pB) exceeds the price
increase (pS − bS)DB(pB). Thus the only active retailers are the ones who accept cards if
pS ≤ bS + vB(pB)5 and the ones who reject card if pS > bS + vB(pB).
Hotelling-Lerner-Salop competition: Appendix 1 shows that retailers’ card acceptance is
also characterized by (3) in the (unique equilibrium of the) classic Hotelling-Lerner-Salop
model of retailing.
Partial internalization: Appendix 1 also considers a more general case where consumers
are informed about retailers’ card acceptance only with probability α, in which case cards
4This is a consequence of a well-known property of log-concave distribution functions (see Pre´kopa
1973).
5We assume that consumers pay by card also when pS = bS + vB(pB).
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are accepted if and only if:6
pS ≤ bS + αvB(pB). (4)
To understand formula (4), note that when consumers are unaware of the retailer’s
card acceptance policy, accepting the card does not help the retailer attract customers.
And so the retailer accepts the card if and only if this reduces his operating cost: pS ≤
bS. When consumers know that the card is accepted (α = 1), they expect to enjoy
extra surplus vB (pB) per card payment (recall that they do not know their convenience
benefit before going to the store), and so the retailer can increase the retail price by the
amount vB (pB)DB (pB) while keeping sales constant. This price increase must exceed
the operating cost increase in order for the retailer to accept the card.
Formula (4) reflects the idea that retailers internalize some of the cardholders’ usage
surplus and are therefore willing to accept cards even if their net cost of card transactions
is positive (i.e., pS > bS). They are willing to incur a cost pS − bS (provided that it is
not too large) per card transaction, in order to offer a better quality of service to their
customers (who value the option of paying by card). The parameter α measures the
extent to which card acceptance makes their store more attractive to the consumer.
For the sake of simplicity and as stated earlier, we assume in the core of the paper
that α = 1. Condition (3) then characterizes card acceptance by retailers.
2.2 The avoided-cost or tourist test
Retailers often complain that they are “forced” to accept card transactions that increase
their net costs. To understand this “must-take cards” argument, one must distinguish
between ex post and ex ante considerations. Once the customer has decided to buy from
the retailer, it is in the latter’s interest to “steer” the former to pay by cash or check
instead of by card whenever pS > bS. But from an ex ante point of view, the retailer must
also take into account the increase in store attractiveness brought about by the option of
paying by card. Because retailers ex ante can always turn down cards, the “must-take
cards” argument refers to the ex post perspective.
Let us accordingly introduce the “avoided-cost test” or “tourist test”: suppose the
buyer in question is a tourist, who will never patronize the store again in the future and
shows up at the cash register with ostensibly enough cash to pay the wares. The merchant
6Again, this internalization of consumer surplus is unrelated to the extent of competition among
retailers. Indeed, formula (4) applies to perfectly competitive retailers, to a retail monopolist and to
Hotelling-Lerner-Salop competition.
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discount passes the tourist test if the retailer is willing to allow this consumer to pay by
card, or equivalently if accepting the card does not increase the retailer’s operating costs:
pS ≤ bS.
Definition: The merchant discount pS passes the tourist test if and only if accepting the
card does not increase the retailer’s net operating cost: pS ≤ bS.
The attraction of the tourist test resides in the fact that the merchant pays no more
than his convenience benefit from card payments.7 Capping the merchant discount at
the merchant’s convenience benefit prevents card payment systems from exploiting the
internalization effect to force merchants to accept card payments that they do not want.
Perhaps more importantly from an economic point of view, the absence of overpayment
by the merchant suggests that the cardholder is not over-incentivized to use the card.
Whether the cap implied by the tourist test is reasonable, though, depends on whether
cardholders are provided with the proper social incentive: The social optimum is reached
only when the cardholders make the efficient decision with regards to the choice of payment
method. As is usual, a “first-best rule” may no longer be adequate when the rest of the
economy is already distorted. Potential distortions come from two sources:
(i) cardholders’ incentives are already distorted: If merchants’ fee equals their convenience
benefit, the cardholder pays more than the net social cost of the card transaction (equal to
the total cost of card payments, cB+cS, minus the merchant’s benefit, bS) whenever issuers
(or acquirers for that matter) levy markups above cost. This suggests that cardholders
may underconsume card payments if the merchant discount passes the tourist test.
(ii) merchants are heterogenous: When merchants differ in their convenience benefit (bS),
inframarginal merchants derive more benefit from card payments than marginal ones.
The tourist test can be applied to each merchant (or at least to merchants who end up
accepting the card), but cardholders, whose usage fee does not depend on the merchant’s
identity, cannot be induced to exactly internalize the welfare of each merchant.
7Note that in the homogenous merchant model, the tourist test either holds or fails for all merchants.
By contrast, in the heterogenous merchant model considered in Section 6, for some merchants may fail
the tourist test while others pass it.
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3 Socially optimal interchange fees
We now model the payment card industry and investigate the impact of interchange fees
on prices pB and pS, and ultimately on social welfare and consumer surplus. Recall that, in
a payment card association, the interchange fee (IF) a represents the amount paid8 by the
seller’s bank (the acquirer) to the buyer’s bank (the issuer) for each card transaction. It
reallocates the total cost9 c = cB+cS of processing the transaction between the two banks.
The acquirers’ net marginal cost becomes cS +a and the issuers’ becomes cI ≡ cB−a. We
simplify the presentation by assuming that acquirers are perfectly competitive (we later
note that the analysis generalizes in the presence of acquirer markups):
pS = cS + a. (5)
By contrast, issuers may have (ex post) market power. Subsection 3.1 presents the bench-
mark model where issuers’ margin m is constant. Subsection 3.2 considers the more
general case of variable issuers’ margin.
3.1 Constant issuers’ margin
We start with the case where issuers’ margin m is constant:
pB = cI + m = cB − a + m.
The interchange fee a passes the tourist test if and only if:
a ≤ aT ≡ bS − cS ⇔ pB ≥ pTB = c− bS + m. (6)
With an inelastic final demand, the different components of social welfare are:
• consumer surplus CS = u − p − pBDB(pB) −
∫ pB
−∞
bBdH(bB), where u denotes the
utility of the good for the consumers, p is the retail price, and the integral represents
the expected convenience cost of cash payments.
• retailers’ profit RP = p− γ − pSDB(pB)− bS (1−DB(pB)),
8Nothing prevents, both in our model and in reality, a from being negative, i.e., the IF from flowing
from the issuer to the acquirer.
9As in the rest of the paper, indices B refer to the buyer side, and indices S refer to the seller side.
Thus cB represents the marginal cost of the issuer (the buyer’s bank) and cS that of the acquirer (the
seller’s bank).
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• banks’ profit πB = (pB + pS − c)DB(pB) = mDB(pB).
Adding these three components, we see that social welfare is equal (up to a constant)
to:
W =
∫ ∞
p
B
(bB + bS − c) dH (bB) .
Social welfare is a single-peaked function of pB, and reaches its maximum at
pWB ≡ c− bS. (7)
The first-best price pWB makes the consumer perfectly internalize the externality as-
sociated with the decision of paying by card. Indeed, the social cost of a card payment
includes both the marginal cost cB of the buyer’s bank and the externality cS−bS exerted
on the seller’s side. Comparing with formula (6), we see that the buyer price pB that
corresponds to the tourist test threshold is equal to the sum of pWB and issuers’ margin m:
pTB = p
W
B + m.
The maximum interchange fee that passes the tourist test, aT , thus corresponds to the
socially optimal IF when banks are perfectly competitive (m = 0), as was first pointed
out by Baxter (1983). The merchant discount corresponding to this upper bound aT
(namely pS = cS + a
T = bS) makes the retailer ex-post indifferent as to the buyer’s choice
of payment instrument (Farrell 2006).
When issuers have market power (m > 0), the socially optimal interchange fee does
not pass the tourist test:
aW = cB − pWB + m = bS − cS + m > aT .
Let us now turn to consumer surplus. Competition Authorities sometimes use the
retail price as a proxy for consumer surplus. However, retail prices are not a good measure
of consumer surplus in our context, because they do not account for transaction costs.
When retailers’ profit is constant (the retail price moves one for one with retail cost),
the formulas for consumer surplus and retailers’ profit given above show that consumer
surplus is equal (up to a constant) to the following function φ, which we call total user
surplus:
φ ≡ (bS − pS)DB (pB) +
∫ ∞
pB
(bB − pB) dH (bB)
≡
∫ ∞
pB
(bB + bS − pB − pS) dH (bB) .
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φ represents the expectation of the total surplus (total benefit bB + bS minus total
price pB + pS) derived from card payments by the two categories of users.
Total user surplus φ is maximized10 for a value pTUSB that exceeds p
W
B :
pTUSB = c− bS + m ≥ pWB = c− bS. (8)
pTUSB exceeds p
W
B because user surplus does not include issuers’ profit. Since issuers’
profit mDB(pB) decreases with pB, a higher pB (and thus a lower interchange fee) implies
a lower expected profit for issuers and thus, around the social welfare optimum, a higher
expected total user surplus. The corresponding interchange fee aTUS is given by:
aTUS = cB − pTUSB + m.
Thus it is equal to the tourist test threshold:
aTUS = bS − cS = aT . (9)
The behavior of functions W and φ is represented in Figure 1.
pWB
W (social welfare)
pTUSB
φ (total usersurplus)
pB
Figure 1: Total user surplus φ, and social welfare W . The vertical difference between
these functions represents the expected profit of issuers. It decreases with
pB . This explains why pTUSB , which maximizes φ, is to the right of p
W
B ,
which maximizes W .
The following proposition summarizes our results.
10Assumption 1 implies a lower bound on cardholder fees: a retailer accepts the card only if pS ≤ bS +
vB (pB). Thus pB = c+m−pS must be equal at least to pmB , defined implicitly by c+m−pmB = bS+vB (pmB ).
Since total user surplus φ and social welfare W are quasi-concave, whether this constraint binds or not
does not modify the comparison between pTUSB , that maximizes φ, and p
W
B , that maximizes W .
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Proposition 2. When issuers’ margin is constant:
i) the interchange fee aW that maximizes social welfare offsets issuers’ margin and thus
is higher than the tourist test threshold aT :
aW = aT + m.
ii) the interchange fee aTUS that maximizes total user surplus is equal to aT .
Thus in the benchmark model, the tourist test detects the interchange fees that are
excessive from the point of view of total user surplus, but it is too restrictive from the
point of view of social welfare.11
Remark (acquirer margins): The analysis can be generalized to allow for constant ac-
quirers’ markups mS. The total margin m then equals the sum of acquirers’ margin mS
and issuers’ margin mB. With constant markups (mB and mS invariant), the wedge
between the welfare-optimal IF, which remains equal to aW = bS − cS + mB, and the
TUS -maximizing IF, aTUS = bS − (cS + mS), increases. Intuitively, the buyer internal-
izes his own cost, including mB, and so in the TUS optimum, the internalization of the
seller’s surplus accounts for the acquiring cost, cS + mS. Note that a
T = bS − cS −mS
still coincides with aTUS. Thus Proposition 2 extends to a constant acquirer margin.
3.2 Variable issuers’ margin
We now allow issuers’ margin to vary with their net cost cI = cB − a. We model issuer
competition in reduced form, denoting by pB(cI) and πB(cI) the issuers’ price and profit
as functions of cI . We assume that pB increases and πB decreases with cI .
12 Issuers’
margin m is a function of pB, defined implicitly by:
13
m (pB (cI)) = pB (cI)− cI . (10)
11Appendix 6 shows that Proposition 2 generalizes to the case where final demand by consumers is
elastic.
12Revealed preference implies that these conditions are always satisfied for a monopoly issuer.
13This is more general than Rochet and Tirole (2002) where we assumed 0 < p′B < 1. Here we do not
require p′B < 1. The assumption that p
′
B < 1 implies that m
′ < 0 (cost absorption). The case p′B = 1
corresponds to that of a constant margin. We also consider here the case where p′B > 1 (e.g. Cournot
oligopoly with isoelastic demand). In this cost amplification case m increases with pB . Weyl (2008) calls
Mark-Up Contraction (MUC) the property that we call cost absorption and shows that for a monopoly
it is implied by log-concavity of demand. His paper contains a very general analysis of pass though in
the case of a single downstream agent.
12
There is cost absorption if p′B < 1 (equivalently m
′ < 0) and cost amplification if p′B > 1
(equivalently m′ > 0). The benchmark case of Section 3.1 assumed cost passthrough
(p′B = 1, that is m
′ = 0). Note that, in all cases, m′ = p
′
B−1
p′B
< 1.
We show in Appendix 2 that the issuers’ price that maximizes total user surplus is
defined implicitly by:
pTUSB = c− bS + m +
m′DB
D′B
(11)
and the corresponding IF is:
aTUS = aT − m
′DB
D′B
. (12)
Thus we have:
Proposition 3. The interchange fee aTUS that maximizes total user surplus is higher
than aT in the cost amplification case (m′ > 0) and lower than aT in the cost absorption
case (m′ < 0). In both cases, the socially optimal interchange fee aW exceeds aT .
Proof of Proposition 3: See Appendix 2.
4 Privately optimal interchange fees
We now compute the IF that maximizes issuers’ profit, first with a monopoly platform
(Section 4.1) and then with competing platforms (Section 4.2). As in Section 3.2, we
allow issuers’ margin to vary with their net cost.
4.1 Monopoly platform
When bS is the same for all merchants and there is no platform competition, the card
association sets the IF at the maximum value that retailers accept. This is because issuers’
profit m(pB)DB(pB) decreases with pB, while pB decreases with the IF . Proposition 1
then implies that the price pmB chosen by the monopoly association is given implicitly by:
pS = bS + vB(pB).
Because pS = c− pB + m (pB) from formulas (5) and (10), we can rewrite this as:
bS − c + pB −m (pB) + vB(pB) = 0. (13)
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Using formula (13), the issuers’ optimal buyer price can be rewritten as:
pmB = c− bS + m (pmB )− vB (pmB ) . (14)
Comparing (14) with formula (7) we see that pmB may be bigger or smaller than p
W
B =
c − bS, depending on issuer market power m and on average cardholder benefit vB. The
interchange fee chosen by the monopoly association is thus:
am = cB − pmB + m(pmB ) = bS − cS + vB (pmB ) . (15)
Proposition 4. i) A monopoly association selects the maximum interchange fee am that
is accepted by retailers.
ii) When m
(
pWB
)
< vB
(
pWB
)
(a condition that is more likely to be satisfied when issuers’
margin is small, and when the net average cardholder benefit is large), am is larger than
the socially optimal IF.
iii) When m
(
pWB
) ≥ vB (pWB ), the interchange fee am chosen by the association coincides
with the (second best) socially optimal IF.
Proof of Proposition 4
Part i) has already been noted. To establish parts ii) and iii), let us recall that social
welfare is equal (up to a constant) to the sum of total user surplus and banks’ profit:
W = φ + mDB =
∫ ∞
pB
(bB + bS − c) dH (bB) ,
which is maximum for pB = p
W
B . Since W is quasi-concave in pB, the socially optimal
buyer price is equal to pWB when this is compatible with merchant acceptance, i.e., when
bS − pWS + vB
(
pWB
)
> 0, and to pmB otherwise. Now
pWS = c + m− pWB = m + bS,
and thus
bS − pWS + vB
(
pWB
)
= vB
(
pWB
)−m (pWB ) .
When this quantity is positive, merchants are ready to accept higher IFs (leading to a
lower buyer price). In this case the socially optimal buyer price is pWB > p
m
B . By contrast,
when vB(p
W
B ) −m(pWB ) is negative, pWS is too high to be accepted by merchants. In this
case the socially optimal buyer price coincides with the price pmB chosen by the monopoly
association. This establishes ii) and iii).
14
Proposition 4 extends an earlier result of Rochet and Tirole (2002) to the case of
an arbitrary issuers’ margin.14 It shows that when there is a single association, when
acquiring is perfectly competitive and when there is no unobservable heterogeneity among
retailers, the association sets the highest possible IF am that retailers accept. am is always
larger than the level aTUS that maximizes total user surplus (and thus consumer surplus).
However it is not necessarily larger than the socially optimal IF. If issuers’ margin is large,
or if retailers’ acceptance of cards has a limited impact on their competitive position (for
example if the average benefit vB of cardholders per card payment is small) the interchange
fee that maximizes social welfare is too large to be acceptable by retailers. The (second
best) socially optimal IF then coincides with the privately optimal one. By contrast, a
for-profit monopoly always chooses a price that is socially sub-optimal:
Proposition 5. A for-profit monopoly system selects prices
(
pMB , p
M
S
)
characterized by:
i) pMS = bS + vB
(
pMB
)
,
ii) pMB = c− bS +
(mDB)
′
D′B
(
pMB
)
.
i) means that total user surplus is equal to zero,15 while ii) implies that pMB = p
TUS
B > p
W
B
(too few card transactions).
Proof of Proposition 5: The profit of the platform is
π = (pB + pS − c−m(pB))DB(pB).
A for-profit monopoly platform chooses (pB, pS) that maximizes π under the constraint
that retailers accept cards: pS ≤ bS + vB(pB). Since π increases with pS, this constraint
binds, which establishes i). Thus we can replace pS by bS + vB(pB). This implies that π
is equal to φ:
π =
∫ ∞
pB
[bS + bB − c−m(pB)] dH(bB) = φ.
Thus pMB = p
TUS
B . Using formula (11), we obtain ii).
14We relax the assumption of “cost absorption” by issuers (see footnote 13).
15Remember that costs and benefits are measured with respect to the alternative payment instrument
(cash). i) means that a for-profit monopoly extracts all the surplus generated by the card.
15
4.2 Platform competition
We now extend our analysis to the competition between two card associations (indexed
by k = 1, 2) in the context of the Hotelling-Lerner-Salop model of retailing.
For simplicity we assume that the two cards are perfect substitutes for both buyers and
sellers. The two associations compete by setting IFs a1 and a2, which in turn determine
user prices (denoted pkB and p
k
S, k = 1, 2). We can characterize retailers’ acceptance
decisions by looking at total user surplus φ.
As shown in Appendix 3, a retailer’s optimal decision is to accept the set of cards that
maximizes the expected value of φ among consumers. This expected value depends in
turn on the proportion of consumers who hold both cards (we call such consumers multi-
homers) and on the proportion of consumers who hold only one of them (single-homers).
A complete analysis of platform competition lies outside the scope of this paper.
We content ourselves with the analysis of two polar cases: Subsection 4.2.1 looks at
the case of complete multi-homing, and Subsection 4.2.2 studies complete single-homing.
Guthrie and Wright (2007) analyze a more general model of platform competition, where
cardholders’ multi-homing decision is endogenized. They show that equilibrium IFs are
always in between the ones obtained in the two polar cases of complete multi-homing and
complete single-homing. Appendix 3 analyzes the retailers’ acceptance decision under
partial multi-homing.
4.2.1 Complete multi-homing
We show in Appendix 3 that, when all consumers have the two cards, the retailers’
equilibrium acceptance policy is:16
• Accept both cards if φ (p1B) = φ (p2B) ≥ 0.
• Accept only the one that attains max (φ(p1B), φ(p2B)) if this maximum is positive.
• Accept none if this maximum is negative.
By symmetry the competition between networks results in (equal) prices, set to maximize
φ (pB).
17
16This condition is a particular case of the general condition (37) obtained in Proposition 13, Appendix
3. It corresponds to a proportion of multi-homers β12 equal to 1 (and thus β1 = β2 = 0).
17This is the two-sided version of Bertrand’s undercutting argument.
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Proposition 6. In the case of complete multi-homing (all consumers have the two cards),
both associations set the same interchange fee, aMH = aTUS. Therefore aMH ≤ aT if and
only if m′(pB) ≤ 0.
Thus the interchange fee set by competing networks is equal to the value that maxi-
mizes total user surplus. Furthermore, the interchange fee passes the tourist test provided
that either there is cost absorption or passthrough by issuers (m′(pB) ≤ 0).
We now examine the polar case of complete single-homing.
4.2.2 Complete single-homing
If all consumers have a single card each, card i is accepted if and only if18 φ (piB) ≥ 0.
This implies that, as with a single network, card associations select the highest IF aSH
that retailers accept. The outcome of network competition is the same as the monopoly
outcome characterized in Proposition 4:
• The price pSHB paid by cardholders is characterized implicitly by φ
(
pSHB
)
= 0, which
gives:
pSHB = c− bS + m
(
pSHB
)− vB (pSHB ) = pmB .
• As illustrated by Figure 2, this price is lower than the value pTUSB that maximizes
consumer surplus (or equivalently total user surplus) when issuers’ margin decreases
with pB (cost absorption case).
19
Proposition 7. Under complete single-homing, the interchange fee aSH set by competing
networks is equal to the monopoly interchange fee am. aSH is thus larger than or equal to
the socially optimal IF, equal to min
(
am, aW
)
.
18This condition is a particular case of the general condition (37) obtained in Proposition 13, Appendix
3. It corresponds to a proportion of multi-homers β12 equal to 0.
19However the reverse may hold when issuers’ margin increases with pB (cost amplification case).
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pWB
•
W (social welfare)
pSHB = p
m
B p
TUS
B = p
MH
B
φ (total user
surplus)
Buyer price
pB
Figure 2: Comparison of buyer prices (in the cost absorption case) when two card
associations compete:
– when consumers single-home, the outcome is pSHB (i.e., the same as in
the case of a single network),
– when consumers multi-home, the outcome is pMHB . It is equal to the
price pTUSB that maximizes total user surplus in the cost absorption
case (as represented here) and lower in the cost amplification case.
4.3 Comparing socially optimal and privately optimal IFs:
We can now summarize the results and compare socially optimal and privately optimal
IFs as a function of the intensity of issuers’ competition.
In the case of perfect (Bertrand) competition among issuers (m = 0), the tourist test
and the welfare and TUS thresholds coincide, as shown in Figure 3. When two cards
associations compete, the outcome is equal to aT when cardholders multihome (MH) and
to the monopoly outcome am if they single-home (SH).
aMH = aW = aTUS = aT aSH = am = aT + vB interchange
fee
tourist test;
welfare and
consumer
surplus
optima.
Figure 3: The perfect competition case (m = 0)
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Under perfect issuer competition, privately optimal IFs, that always lie in the interval
(aMH , aSH) are (weakly) higher than the socially optimal IF (aW = aTUS), which coincides
with the tourist test threshold aT . Thus if issuer competition were perfect, it would be
legitimate to cap the IF at aW and use the tourist test as a check.
However, under the more reasonable assumption that issuers have some ex post market
power (which seems to be the working hypothesis of Competition Authorities in many
regions of the world), the analysis is more complex. When issuers’ margin is constant
(and not too big) the situation is represented in Figure 4.20
Under imperfect issuer competition, the tourist test threshold again coincides with
the total user surplus optimum but this time the socially optimal IF (which internalizes
issuers’ profit) is higher. The competitive IF lies in the interval (aMH , aSH): it is therefore
always (weakly) higher than aTUS but may be higher or lower than aW . If Competition
Authorities aim at maximizing consumer surplus, a cap based on the tourist test threshold
is still warranted. This is not the case if the objective is to maximize social welfare.
When issuers’ margin is not constant, the tourist test threshold does not coincide any-
more with the interchange fee that maximizes total user surplus. As shown in Proposition
3, it is higher when m′ > 0 (cost amplification) and lower when m′ < 0 (cost absorption).
tourist test;
total user
surplus
optimum;
prevails
under
(complete)
multi-homing
aW = aT +m aSH = aT + vB
interchange
fee
aMH = aTUS = aT
welfare
optimum
monopoly
outcome, also
prevails under
single-homing
Figure 4: Constant issuer margin (m > 0)
20When m > vB(pB), the first-best IF aW is not accepted by merchants: the second-best IF coincides
with the monopoly outcome am.
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5 Entry: revisiting the notion of total user surplus
The previous sections analyzed the interchange fees associated with two benchmarks,
corresponding to the maximization of social welfare and to that of consumer surplus
(TUS). Focusing on the narrow notion of consumer surplus is legitimate for a short-
term analysis as long as the welfare of shareholders is weighted much less heavily than
that of consumers. In the medium and long term, though, issuers respond to increased
profitability by offering a wider variety of products or by reducing prices, for example
under the pressure of new entrants.
To illustrate the impact of entry, this section computes the “long-term total user
surplus” first in the context of an homogeneous issuing industry in which issuers do
not compete perfectly (so entry reduces price but does not increase variety), then in a
context of contestable issuing sub-markets. While these environments are special, they in
a sense are polar cases. The homogeneous-good case confers limited benefits on the entry
mechanism: While entry benefits consumers through lower prices, the incentive to enter
comes in large part from business stealing. Indeed, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show
that in an homogeneous-good, free-entry industry, the equilibrium number of firms under
free entry is in general larger than the efficient number. To be precise, it always exceeds
the efficient number minus 1. Contestable issuing sub-markets by contrast rule out any
business stealing, and thereby focus on pure product creation. Thus the former (latter)
environment is rather unfavorable (favorable) to a social accounting of the benefits from
entry.
5.1 Homogeneous issuing industry
Let cI ≡ cB − a = c− pS denote the issuers’ marginal cost, and N the number of issuers.
The fixed cost of being in the issuing industry is F > 0. Adapting our previous notation
to account for the number N of issuers, we denote by pB = pB(cI , N) and m = m(pB, N)
the equilibrium price and margin21 for a fixed number N of issuers. We assume that
keeping the cardholder fee pB constant, the issuer margin decreases with the number of
issuers: ∂m
∂N
< 0 (competition reduces margins). The number of issuers is now endogenous,
21For convenience, m is expressed as a function of pB and N . This is legitimate since, for N given, pB
and cI are in a one-to-one relation with each other.
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and given by the unique solution22 N = N(pB) to the zero-profit equation:
m(pB, N)DB(pB) = NF. (16)
Note that, from our assumption that issuers’ profit m(pB, N)D(pB) decreases with pB (N
being constant), the number of issuers N(pB) also decreases with pB.
The long-term total user surplus (also equal to social welfare since issuers in the
long term make no supra-normal profit) is equal to the sum of cardholder and merchant
surpluses:
TUSLT =
∫ ∞
pB
[bB + bS − c−m(pB, N(pB))] dH(bB).
The only difference with short-term total user surplus φ (see formula (36)) is that the
margin m(pB) depends on pB also through the number N of issuers. TUS
LT is maximized
for
p∗B = c− bS + m +
DB
D′B
[
∂m
∂pB
+
∂m
∂N
N ′
]
. (17)
Comparing with pTUSB (given by formula (11)), that maximizes short-term total user
surplus φ, we see that p∗B contains an additional term
DB
D′B
∂m
∂N
N ′, corresponding to the
impact of pB on the number of issuers, and thus indirectly on the level of issuers’ margin.
This additional term is negative since D′B,
∂m
∂N
and N ′ are all negative. Thus
p∗B < p
TUS
B .
The intuition for this result is that a lower net issuer cost cI = cB − a (and thus
a lower cardholder fee pB) increases entry and competition in the issuing market, and
thereby reduces issuers’ margin.
Note also that p∗B > p
T
B = c − bS + m
(
pTB
)
if and only if there is long-term cost
absorption: [
∂m
∂pB
+
∂m
∂N
N ′
]
< 0.
Long-term cost absorption is less likely to prevail than short-term cost absorption
(
∂m
∂pB
< 0
)
,
as the second term is positive.
To compare p∗B and p
W
B = c− bS (that maximizes short-term welfare), differentiate the
zero-profit condition that defines N(pB):
m(pB, N(pB))D(pB) = N(pB)F,
22We neglect the constraint that N is an integer.
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yielding: (
∂m
∂pB
+
∂m
∂N
N ′
)
DB + mD
′
B = N
′F. (18)
Now
p∗B − pWB = p∗B − c + bS.
By using formula (17) defining p∗B, we get:
p∗B − pWB = m +
DB
D′B
(
∂m
∂pB
+
∂m
∂N
N ′
)
=
1
D′B
[
mD′B + DB
(
∂m
∂pB
+
∂m
∂N
N ′
)]
.
where the right-hand side is computed at p∗B. Comparing with (18), we see that:
p∗B − pWB =
N ′
D′B
F > 0.
We can now state our results in terms of the associated interchange fees a∗, aTUS and
aW .
Proposition 8. For an homogeneous issuing industry with free entry, the long-term total-
user surplus maximizing interchange fee a∗ lies in between aTUS, that maximizes short-
term total-user-surplus, and aW , the short-term first best:
aTUS < a∗ < aW .
a∗ passes the tourist test
(
a∗ ≤ aT ) if there is long-term cost absorption ( m (pB, N (pB))
decreasing) and fails it in case of long-term cost amplification (m (pB, N (pB)) increasing).
As already noted, long-term cost absorption is less likely to prevail than short-term cost
absorption. This is illustrated by the following example. Consider Cournot competition
with linear demand: DB (pB) = 1 − pB. The industry is viable if the monopoly profit(
1− cI
2
)2
exceeds entry cost F . In this case the short-term equilibrium price and the
short-term margin are:
pB (cI , N) =
1 + NcI
1 + N
and m (pB, N) = pB − cI = pB − (1 + N)pB − 1
N
=
1− pB
N
. (19)
Thus there is short-term cost absorption
(
∂m
∂pB
< 0
)
, implying, by formula (9):
aTUS = aT −
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∂m
∂pB
· DB
D′B
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (pTUSB ) < aT .
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By contrast, there is long-term cost passthrough. Indeed, the zero-profit condition,
m (pB, N) (1− pB) = NF,
yields :
m (pB, N (pB)) =
√
F ,
which is independent of pB. Thus long-term total user surplus is maximized for a
∗ = aT =
bS − cS < aW = bS − cS +
√
F . Thus the tourist test threshold aT coincides with the IF
a∗ that maximizes long-term total user surplus.
5.2 Pure product variety
To illustrate the product-diversity argument, we build a stylized example that does not
embody any business stealing effect. Consider a continuum of niche markets for cards,
indexed by the fixed cost of entry F . All markets are identical but for the fixed cost of
entry. Let K(F ) denote the cumulative distribution function of F .
Each market is contestable (is an “auction market”). In equilibrium of a contestable
market, there is a single firm, and this firm makes no profit; the markup m (cI , F ) is the
smallest solution of:
mDB (cI + m) = F. (20)
As
d
dm
(mDB(cI + m)) > 0 in the relevant range, the contestable market example
exhibits long-term cost amplification23
(
∂m
∂cI
> 0
)
.
Let F ∗(cI), a decreasing function, be defined by:
max
m
{mDB(cI + m)} = F ∗(cI).
It corresponds to the maximum fixed cost that an issuer can sustain. K [F ∗ (cI)]
represents the mass of active issuers.
Note that
bS − pS = bS − cS − a = aT − a.
23Total differentiation of (20) gives indeed:
d
dm
(mDB(cI + m))
∂m
∂cI
+ mD′B (cI + m) = 0.
The result follows from D′B < 0.
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Then
TUSLT =
∫ F ∗(cI)
0
[vB (cI + m (cI , F )) + (bS − pS)]DB (cI + m (cI , F )) dK(F )
=
∫ F ∗(cI)
0
[
vB (cI + m (cI , F )) +
(
cI − cTI
)]
DB (cI + m (cI , F )) dK(F ),
where cI = cB − a and cTI ≡ cB − aT .
Using
vBDB =
∫ ∞
cI+m(cI ,F )
[bB − [cI + m (cI , F )]] dH (bB) ,
we see that
TUSLT =
∫ F ∗(cI)
0
∫ ∞
cI+m(cI ,F )
[
bB −m (cI , F )− cTI
]
dH (bB) dK(F ).
Then at cI = c
T
I :
dTUSLT
dcI
=
dF ∗
dcI
[ ∫ ∞
cTI +m(c
T
I ,F )
[bB −m(cTI , F )− cTI ]dH(bB)
]
k(F ∗)
−
∫ F ∗(cTI )
0
∫ ∞
cTI +m(c
T
I ,F )
∂m
∂cI
dH(bB)dK(F )
=
dF ∗
dcI
vBDBk (F
∗)−
∫ F ∗(cTI )
0
DB
∂m
∂cI
dK(F ) < 0
(where F ∗ ≡ F ∗ (cI)). Thus long-term total user surplus increases when cI is reduced
below cII (i.e. a increased over a
T ).
Proposition 9. The long-term total-user-surplus maximizing interchange fee in the pure-
product-variety model always exceeds the level given by the tourist test: a∗ > aT .
6 Heterogenous retailers
As a further robustness check, we introduce unobservable heterogeneity in the retailers’
convenience benefit bS. Following Schmalensee (2002), we assume that sellers’ convenience
benefit is drawn from a continuous distribution with c.d.f. G:
G (bS) = Pr
(
b˜S ≤ bS
)
.
Following Wright (2004), we assume that the retail sector consists in a continuum of
subsectors, each corresponding to a value of bS. The platform however does not have
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enough information to discriminate among retailers, and thus sets a uniform interchange
fee. Merchants know their individual bS before accepting cards. The buyers’ distribution
of convenience benefits, H(bB), is independent of the market in which they buy. Con-
sumers buy one good in each of these markets and patronize the store that offers the best
combination of retail price, transportation cost and quality of service (determined here
by the retailer’s decision of whether to accept cards). For given prices for card services
(pB and pS), the retailer’s equilibrium behavior is characterized by condition (3), but now
this behavior is conditional on the realization of bS: A retailer in “subsector” bS accepts
card payments if and only if:
bS ≥ b̂S ≡ pS − vB(pB).
Let vS (̂bS) denote the average retailer surplus per card payment:
vS
(̂
bS
) ≡
∫∞
 bS
(
bS − b̂S
)
dG(bS)
1−G(̂bS) = E
(
bS − b̂S|bS ≥ b̂S
)
. (21)
The volume of card transactions is easily computed:
V = DB (pB)DS
(
b̂S
)
, (22)
where DS
(
b̂S
)
= 1−G
(
b̂S
)
represents the “demand” for card transactions by retailers.24
6.1 Socially optimal interchange fees
Social welfare is maximized when two symmetric “Samuelson conditions” are satisfied:
p∗B = c− E
[
bS|bS ≥ b̂S
]
,
and
b̂S = c− E [bB|bB ≥ p∗B] .
These Samuelson conditions imply a “balanced externality condition”: expected sur-
pluses per card payment are equal for buyers and sellers. Indeed, taking the difference
between the two Samuelson conditions above gives:
p∗B − b̂S = E [bB|bB ≥ p∗B]− E
[
bS|bS ≥ b̂S
]
.
24A similar multiplicative formula for the volume of card transactions (with α = 0 and thus b̂S = pS)
was first proposed by Schmalensee (2002) and later used in a more general context by Rochet and Tirole
(2003).
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Now, recall that the buyers’ expected surplus equals
vB (p
∗
B) ≡ E [bB − p∗B|bB ≥ p∗B] .
We obtain:
vB(p
∗
B) = vS (̂bS) ≡ E
[
bS − b̂S|bS ≥ b̂S
]
,
where vS (̂bS) equals the expected surplus of sellers per card payment.
When m = 0 (perfect competition among issuers), this social optimum can be imple-
mented by setting the interchange fee at:
a∗ = cB − p∗B = E
[
bS|bS ≥ b̂S
]
− cS.
This is because merchants fully internalize cardholder surplus (so the second Samuelson
condition is met25).
The corresponding merchant discount is
pS = E
[
bS|bS ≥ b̂S
]
.
In this case the average merchant (among those who accept cards) is ex post indifferent
as to the means of payment chosen by the consumer. This implies that unless all retailers
are identical, some would want to reject cards ex post. Efficiency cannot require that the
tourist test be met by all participating merchants because cardholders must internalize
the welfare of the average merchant and not of the marginal one, who values card pay-
ments less than the average merchant. Capping merchant discounts at the convenience
benefit of the most reluctant merchants provides the cardholder with an incentive for
underconsumption of card payments. The next proposition summarizes these results and
considers the more general case where issuers’ margin m is positive, but constant.
Proposition 10. Assume that merchants differ in the net convenience benefit bS that
they derive from card transactions and that issuers’ margin is constant (perfect cost
passthrough).
i) The socially optimal prices
(
pWB , p
W
S
)
are characterized by:
D′B
DB
[vS + [m− vB]] = D
′
S
DS
[1 + v′B] [vB + [m− vB]] , (23)
25This condition is b̂S = c − E (bB |bB ≥ p∗B) = c − pB − vB (p∗B). When pB + pS = c, this condition
coincides with the definition of b̂S (condition (21)).
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where DB = DB
(
pWB
)
, vB = vB
(
pWB
)
and vS = vS
(
b̂WS
)
.
ii) The user prices
(
pTUSB , p
TUS
S
)
that maximize total user surplus are characterized by the
“balanced externality condition”:
vS
(
b̂TUSS
)
= vB
(
pTUSB
)
. (24)
This can be implemented by selecting a merchant discount equal to the average conve-
nience benefit among the merchants who accept cards.
Note that for m = 0, condition (23) yields the balanced externality condition (24).
Proof of Proposition 10: See Appendix 4.
Proposition 10 shows how the “optimal balancing” condition
D′B
DB
vS =
D′S
DS
vB obtained
in Rochet-Tirole (2003) must be amended to reflect internalization and market power.
For an association, a decrease in price on one side must be offset by an equal increase of
price on the other side. Losing, say, one seller implies a waste of surplus vB on the buyer
side, and conversely. This explains the basic optimal balancing formula. To understand
how internalization and market power modify this formula, note first that an increase in
pS has two effects on seller demand as it leads to an equal
26 decrease in pB and thus in a
perceived increase in quality of service |v′B|. Thus everything is as if the net price increase
on the seller side were 1 + v′B < 1, or, put differently, as if the elasticity on the seller
side had been scaled down by this factor. Second, the surpluses vj on side j ∈ {B,S}
created by increased demand on side i become vj +[m− vB]; the correction is equal to the
markup m (the issuers’ “surplus”) minus the buyers’ surplus which is already internalized
by the sellers.27
6.2 Privately optimal interchange fees
Let us now compare the payment system’s choice of interchange fee with the TUS and
welfare benchmarks obtained above. The following result (whose proof can be found in
Appendix 5) assumes that the issuers’ margin m is constant, so that pB + pS, equal to
c + m, is itself a constant.
Proposition 11. Assume that merchants differ in the net convenience benefit bS that
they derive from card transactions and that issuers’ margin is constant (perfect cost
26This is because this section assumes constant issuers’ margin.
27The difference m− vB also played an important role in Proposition 4.
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passthrough).
i) Provided that social welfare is quasi-concave in the buyer price, the IF selected by a
monopoly association is lower than the socially optimal value if and only if average mer-
chant surplus per card payment exceeds cardholders’:
vS
(
b̂mS
)
> vB (p
m
B ) . (25)
ii) This condition is equivalent to the “average tourist test” (pS < E
(
bS|bS > b̂S
)
).
iii) When total user surplus is quasi-concave in the buyer price, this condition is also
necessary and sufficient for the monopoly IF to be lower than the value that maximizes
total user surplus.
Proposition 11 shows that when the merchant homogeneity assumption is relaxed,
the price structure chosen by a monopoly platform, in the absence of a regulation, is
no longer systematically biased in favor of cardholders.28 Intuitively, issuers want to
maximize volume and do not account for buyer and seller surpluses. The bias induced by
a private choice of IF depends on the relative surplus of the two groups of users. When
the average net benefit of retailers from card payments vS is greater than the average net
benefit of consumers vB, the IF chosen by a monopoly platform is too low, from both
viewpoints of social welfare and total user surplus.
To prove Proposition 11 (see Appendix 4), one first demonstrates that in the absence
of IF regulation, a monopoly network chooses the price structure (pmB , p
m
S ) that maximizes
volume V = DBDS subject to pB + pS being constant. It is characterized by the equality
of the semi-elasticities, where the sellers’ semi-elasticity must be reduced to account for
their internalization of buyer surplus:
D′B
DB
(pmB ) =
D′S
DS
(
b̂mS
)
[1 + v′B] . (26)
7 Conclusion
This paper has shown that Vickers (2005)’s “must-take cards” argument should be taken
seriously. Due to their internalization of some fraction of buyer surplus, retailers may
indeed end up accepting cards that raise their operating costs. Yet, this internalization
need not be detrimental to social welfare. Two polar cases must be considered.
28Condition (25) is never satisfied when merchants are homogeneous. As established by Proposition
4, the monopoly IF is then higher than or equal to the socially optimal IF, which is consistent with
Proposition 11.
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Under merchant homogeneity and in the absence of platform competition (or under
cardholder single-homing), the interchange fee chosen by issuers exceeds the short-term
socially optimal level if and only if cardholder benefits (or at least the fraction of them
internalized by merchants) exceed the issuers’ per transaction markup. Under platform
competition and multi-homing, the IF is smaller than the value that maximizes short-term
total user surplus (TUS, equal to cardholders’ plus merchants’ surplus, i.e. not including
issuer markups), and a fortiori the value that maximizes social welfare.
When issuer margins are constant and merchants are homogenous, the tourist test is
a proper and practical policy tool. By definition, the tourist test fails whenever retailers
would want to refuse a card payment by a non-repeat customer with enough cash in her
pocket. This implies that the IF lies above the level that maximizes short-term total
user surplus, thus indicating that platform competition is insufficient or that cardholder
single-homing is prevalent. A key result of this paper is thus that, with constant issuer
margins and homogenous merchants, a regulatory cap based on merchants’ avoided cost is
legitimate when competition authorities aim at maximizing short-term total user surplus.
We also studied the robustness of this result and identified three reasons why the
tourist test may yield false positives even if we focus on TUS.
First, in the short run, the TUS-maximizing IF fails the tourist test if the issuing
industry’s prices exhibit cost amplification (conversely, cost absorption leads to false neg-
atives). Second, in the long term, issuer markups translate into entry and thereby lower
prices and increased variety, and so the short-term analysis yields TUS-maximizing IFs
that are smaller than their long-term counterpart. Third, merchants are heterogenous,
and an IF that properly guides cardholders’ decisions must reflect the average, not the
marginal merchant benefit. This implies that the merchants who benefit least from the
card, say the large retailers, are likely to fail the tourist test at the social optimum.
An indirect contribution of the paper has been to supply a theoretical framework in
which platforms’ business strategies and antitrust concerns can be taken to the data.
Besides its two-sidedness, a novel and central aspect of the environment considered here
is the internalization of buyer surplus by sellers. The identification of supply and demand
functions and the estimation of welfare are policy relevant and intellectually challenging
questions on the empirical agenda.
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Appendix 1: Retailers’ card acceptance in the Hotelling-
Lerner-Salop model
This appendix shows that, when retailers compete as in the Hotelling-Lerner-Salop model,
and consumers only learn retailers’ card acceptance policies with probability α ≤ 1,
retailers accept cards at equilibrium if and only if pS ≤ bS + αvB(pB). In the special case
where α = 1, this establishes the last part of Proposition 1 (the first and second parts
were proven in the text). We prove this result for arbitrary α.
We also provide an explicit model of competition in the (card good) retail sector, using
the Lerner-Salop model of product differentiation: Retailers and consumers are located
uniformly on a circle of length normalized to one. The timing is as follows:
1. First, each consumer learns his preference across brands of the card good offered by the
retailers, as well as the prices chosen by the retailers. Furthermore, he learns all stores’
card acceptance policies with probability α, and does not learn any with probability 1−
α.29 The consumer then chooses which store to patronize. The optimal choice minimizes
the sum of three terms: the retail price pjR, the transportation cost tΔ
j incurred from
going to the store (where Δj is the distance to the store and t > 0 is a given parameter),
and the expected transaction cost associated with the payment mode (this term is detailed
below).
2. Second, after choosing a store, the consumer learns his convenience benefit of using a
card rather than cash in the particular instance, and chooses the payment mode among the
ones accepted by the retailer. The relative cost b˜B of the alternative payment mode (cash)
is random, and drawn from another continuous distribution with cumulative distribution
function H:
H (bB) = Pr
(
b˜B ≤ bB
)
. (27)
As we noted, this convenience benefit b˜B is observed by the consumer only once he is
in the store. The net benefit of paying by card is thus equal to the difference b˜B − pB.
A card payment is optimal for the consumer whenever this net benefit is positive. The
29It may seem strange that when α < 1 some consumers know the prices, but not the card acceptance
decisions. Note however that a) they do not need to know all retailers prices (as in Lal-Matutes 1994, it
suffices that they know at least one price for the reasoning to apply), and b) whether they know some
price or not, card acceptance helps attract consumers. In this latter case, the acceptance threshold is a
non linear function of α.
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proportion of card payments is denoted DB (pB):
DB (pB) = Pr
(
b˜B > pB
)
= 1−H (pB) . (28)
Retailers j = 1, · · · , R compete in two stages:30
1. First, they simultaneously decide whether to accept the card. We denote the decision
of retailer j by a variable xj equal to 1 if retailer j accepts the card, and 0 if he does not.
2. Second, they simultaneously set their retail prices: pj is chosen by retailer j so as to
maximize his profit:
πj =
[
pj − γ − bS − xj (pS − bS)DB (pB)
]
yj, (29)
where γ is the cost of producing the card good, and bS is the cost of the alternative
payment mode for the seller (assumed constant across sellers). Thus (pS − bS)DB (pB)
represents the expected net cost of card payments for the seller (incurred only when
xj = 1). Finally, yj represents the market share of retailer j.
Retailer j’s market share is a function of the retail prices set by retailer j and his
neighbors j − 1 and j + 1, as well as the card acceptance decisions xj, xj−1 and xj+1:
yj =
1
R
+
1
2t
[
pj−1 + pj+1 − 2pj − α (xj−1 + xj+1 − 2xj) sB (pB)] (30)
where
sB (pB) ≡
∫ ∞
pB
(bB − pB) dH (bB)
denotes the expected surplus that a buyer derives from the option of paying by card. Our
next proposition relates the retailers’ acceptance decision to prices pB and pS and to the
internalization parameter α.31
Proposition 12. The retail sector equilibrium is unique and symmetric.
• retailers (all) accept the card if and only if:
pS ≤ bS + αvB (pB) (31)
(otherwise none accepts the card). If this condition is satisfied, then:
30The timing here is irrelevant: the equilibrium would be the same if the first and second stages were
simultaneous. This is because we assume that consumers’ transactional benefits are drawn ex post.
31Proposition 12 can easily be extended to the case where two card networks offer identical cards and
set identical IFs.
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• retailers pass through card transaction costs (or benefits) into the retail price:
p∗ = γ + bS +
t
R
− (bS − pS)DB (pB) (32)
(where γ + bS is the marginal cost of a cash transaction and
t
R
the Hotelling mark-
up), and the total profit of the retail sector is constant:
π =
t
R
, (33)
• consumers’ total purchase cost is given by:[
γ + E
(
b˜B
)
+ bS
]
+
5t
4R
− φ(pB), (34)
Proof of Proposition 12
Suppose, first, that all retailers accept the card. In this case, formulas (29) and (30)
show that the profit of retailer j is maximized when
0 =
∂πj
∂pj
= yj − [pj − γ − bS − (pS − bS)DB (pB)] /t.
The equilibrium market shares are all equal
(
yj ≡ 1
R
)
, and so are retail prices:
pj ≡ p∗ =
[
γ + bS +
t
R
]
− (bS − pS)DB (pB)
which establishes formula (32). Consumer total purchase cost is then equal to the sum
of the retail price p∗, the average transportation cost
t
4R
and the expected transaction
cost for the cardholder E
(
b˜B
)
+
∫ ∞
pB
(pB − bB) dH (bB). Formulas (34) and (33) are then
immediate.
Suppose now that retailer j considers rejecting the card. A new price equilibrium
arises where all retailers except j increase their price and market share, whereas retailer
j decreases his price and market share but also his cost (assuming bS < pS). It is easy to
check that the net effect is to decrease retailer j’s profit if and only if
φα ≡ (bS − pS)DB (pB) + α
∫ ∞
pB
(bB − pB) dH (bB) ≥ 0.
We call φα the weighted total user surplus.
32 Intuitively, with a linear demand (stemming
from the uniform distribution of consumers), retailer j can lower his price by α
∫∞
pB
(bB −
32Note that when α = 1, φα coincides with total user surplus: φ1 = φ.
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pB)dH(bB) and keep the same market share as when he accepts the card. The first term
in the latter inequality is (minus) the cost saving associated with rejecting the card.
The condition is thus equivalent to the assertion that accepting the card maximizes the
perceived or weighted total user surplus, where only a fraction α of the buyer surplus
from using the card is internalized. More formally, since φα has the same sign as
φα
DB(pB)
we have that:
φα ≥ 0 ⇔ φα
DB(pB)
= bS − pS + αvB(pB) ≥ 0.
This condition ends the proof of formula (31) and, thus, of Proposition 12. The equilibrium
is unique. 
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3
For convenience, we take pB (instead of a) as the variable of interest. By assumption, pB
is increasing in cI = cB − a, which implies that pB is decreasing in a. We can thus reason
on pB, keeping in mind that an increase in the IF results in a decrease in pB.
The total profit of the members of the payment card association (that is of the issuers,
since acquirers make no profit in our model) is thus:
πB = m (pB)DB (pB) . (35)
We assume that, provided that merchants are kept on board, πB is decreasing in pB:
issuers prefer higher IFs.
The interchange fee a passes the tourist test if and only if
a ≤ aT ≡ bS − cS ⇐⇒ pB ≥ pTB ≡ c− bS + m
(
pTB
)
.
pTB is uniquely defined since m
′ < 1. Similarly the socially optimal interchange fee is:
aW = cB − pWB + m
(
pWB
)
,
where pWB = c− bS. Thus
aW = bS − cS + m
(
pWB
)
> aT .
Finally, total user surplus
φ (pB) =
∫ ∞
pB
[bB + bS − c−m (pB)] dH (bB) (36)
35
is maximized for a value pTUSB that satisfies the first-order condition:
φ′ (pB) = [pB + bS − c−m]D′B −m′DB = 0.
Thus
pTUSB = c− bS + m +
m′DB
D′B
= pWB +
(mDB)
′
D′B
.
Since (mDB)
′ < 0 and D′B < 0, p
TUS
B is higher than p
W
B . Finally, the corresponding
interchange fee aTUS is given by:
aTUS = cB − pTUSB + m
(
pTUSB
)
= bS − cS − m
′DB
D′B
(
pTUSB
)
= aT − m
′DB
D′B
(
pTUSB
)
.
Remark (acquirer margins): As in the case of constant margins, the analysis can be
extended to allow for acquirer margins. The welfare optimal IF remains aW = bS − cS +
mB (pB). By contrast, the formula for the TUS optimum is altered.
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Appendix 3: Retailers’ acceptance decisions under par-
tial multi-homing
We extend the analysis of Appendix 1 to the case of two competing cards, with partial
buyers’ multi-homing.
For simplicity, this appendix takes as given the proportions of buyers who own the two
cards. Specifically, let βk (k = 1, 2) denote the proportion of buyers who own only card
k (the single-homers) and β12 denote the proportion of buyers who own both cards (the
multi-homers). Like before, we assume for simplicity that all consumers have a card34
(i.e., β1 + β2 + β12 = 1). The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the retail
sector (both in terms of card acceptance and retail prices) as a function of payment card
prices and parameters β1, β2 and β12.
33Letting mS (pS) = mS (cS + a) = mS (c + mB (pB)− pB) denote the acquirers’ markup, then at the
TUS optimum,
pB + bS − (c + mB + mS) = DB
D′B
[m′B −m′S (1−m′B)] .
34This is not inconsistent with our model, which assumes that issuers do not charge fixed fees to
cardholders.
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Proposition 13. At the equilibrium of the retail sector:
• retailers accept both cards if and only if:
β1φ
(
p1B
)
+ (β2 + β12)φ
(
p2B
) ≥ max [0, (β1 + β12)φ (p1B) , (β2 + β12)φ (p2B)] . (37)
If this condition is satisfied then:
• retail prices35 are given by:
p∗ =
[
γ + bS +
t
R
]
− β1
(
bS − p1S
)
DB
(
p1B
)− (β2 + β12) (bS − p2S)DB (p2B) ,
• aggregate demand for the card good equals36 β1D (u∗1) + (β2 + β12)D (u∗2), where
u∗k = p
∗ +
t
4R
+ E (˜bB)− sB
(
pkB
)
, k = 1, 2.
• consumer surplus equals β1S (u∗1) + (β2 + β12)S (u∗2),
• finally, the total profit of the retail sector is
π =
t
R
[β1D (u
∗
1) + (β2 + β12)D (u
∗
2)]
Proof of Proposition 13:
It proceeds similarly to that of Proposition 12 in Appendix 1. In equilibrium, retailers
accept the (set of) cards that maximize the expectation of total user surplus φ over
all buyers. Accepting only card k(k = 1, 2) allows a fraction (βk + β12) of buyers to
pay by card generating total user surplus φ(pkB). The right-hand side of condition (37)
corresponds to the maximum of three outcomes: accepting no card, accepting card 1
alone, and accepting card 2 alone. The left-hand side of condition (37) corresponds to the
expectation of weighted user surplus when the merchant accepts both cards. In this case
multi-homers prefer to use card 2 (since p2B ≤ p1B), which explains the fraction (β2 + β12)
of buyers who use card 2. This establishes the first bullet point in Proposition 13. Retail
prices (second bullet point) are given at equilibrium by the average unit cost faced by
merchants (including the net cost of card payments) plus a constant margin t
R
. The other
bullet points are immediate.
35We assume that retailers find it too costly or are not allowed to charge different prices for transactions
settled through different cards.
36For simplicity, we assume that the determinants of the choice of cards by consumers are independent
from the parameters that determine the gross utility u˜ obtained by consumers when they consume the
card good.
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Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 10
Social welfare is given by:
W
(
pB, b̂S(pB)
)
=
∫ ∞
 bS
∫ ∞
pB
[bS + bB − c] dH (bB) dG (bS) , (38)
where b̂S(pB) = pS − vB(pB) = c+m− pB − vB(pB). Since we have assumed that issuers’
margin m is constant, social welfare is maximized for a value pWB of buyers’ price such
that:
∂W
∂pB
(pWB , b̂
W
S ) =
∂W
∂b̂S
(pWS , b̂
W
S )
(
1 + v′B
(
pWB
))
, (39)
where b̂WS = b̂S(p
W
B ).
Using formula (38) we see that
∂W
∂pB
(pWB , b̂
W
S ) = D
′
B(p
W
B )
∫ ∞
 bWS
(pWB + bS − c)dG(bS).
Now by definition:
vS (̂b
W
S )DS (̂b
W
S ) =
∫ ∞
 bWS
(bS − b̂WS )dG(bS) =
∫ ∞
bWS
(
bS − c−m + pWB + vB(pWB )
)
dG(bS).
Thus we can write:
∂W
∂pB
(pWB , b̂
W
S ) = D
′
B(p
W
B )DS (̂b
W
S )
[
vS (̂b
W
S ) + m− vB
(
pWB
)]
.
Similarly
∂W
∂b̂S
(pWB , b̂
W
S ) = D
′
S (̂b
W
S ) ·
∫ ∞
pWB
(
b̂WS + bB − c
)
dH(bB),
while
vB(p
W
B )DB(p
W
B ) =
∫ ∞
pWB
(
bB − pWB
)
dH(bB).
Thus:
∂W
∂b̂S
(pWB , b̂
W
S ) = D
′
S (̂b
W
S )DB(p
W
B )
[
vB(p
W
B )− vB
(
pWB
)
+ m
]
.
Thus the first-order condition for welfare maximization can be rewritten as:
D′B(p
W
B )
DB(pWB )
[
vS (̂b
W
S ) + m− vB
(
pWB
)]
=
D′S (̂b
W
S )
DS (̂bWS )
[
vB
(
pWB
)− vB (pWB )+ m] (1 + v′B (pWB )) .
This is equivalent to formula (23).
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Total User Surplus (TUS) is equal to:
φ
(
pB, b̂S(pB)
)
=
∫ ∞
 bS(pB)
∫ ∞
pB
[bB + bS − c−m]dH(bB)dG(bS).
Note that, by definition of b̂S(pB) we have that:
∀pB, ∂φ
∂b̂S
(
pB, b̂S(pB)
)
= 0.
This is because ∫ ∞
pB
[
bB + b̂S(pB)− c−m
]
dH(bB) ≡ 0.
Thus TUS is maximum for pTUSB such that
∂φ
∂b̂S
(
pB, b̂S(pB)
)
= 0 =
∫ ∞
 bS(pB)
[pB + bS − c−m] dG(bS).
Since b̂S(pB) = pS + vB(pB), this is equivalent to formula (24).
Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 11
Given our assumption that issuers’ margin is constant, their profit is maximized for a
value pmB of buyers’ price that maximizes the volume of card transactions, given by:
V (pB) = DB(pB)DS (̂bS(pB)),
where b̂S(pB) = c + m− pB − vB (pB).
Now pmB is given by the first-order condition:
V ′
V
(pmB ) =
D′B
DB
(pmB )−
D′S
DS
(̂bmS )(1 + v
′
B (p
m
B )) = 0,
which gives (26).
When social welfare is quasi-concave with respect to the buyer price, the privately
optimal IF (associated with buyer price pmB and seller threshold b̂
m
S = b̂S(p
m
B )) is excessively
low whenever
Δ ≡ ∂W
∂pB
(pmB , b̂
m
S )− [1 + v′B (pmB )]
∂W
∂b̂S
(pmB , b̂
m
S ) < 0.
Adapting the formulas obtained above, we see that
Δ = D′B(p
m
B )DS (̂b
m
S )
[
vS (̂b
m
S ) + m− vB (pmB )
]
−[1 + v′B (pmB )]D′S (̂bmS )DB(pmB )[vB(pmB )− vB (pmB ) + m].
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Applying condition (26) allows us to simplify this expression:
Δ = D′B(p
m
B )DS (̂b
m
S )
[
vS (̂b
m
S ) + m− vB (pmB )− vB(pmB ) + vB (pmB )−m
]
,
= D′B(p
m
B )DS (̂b
m
S )
[
vS (̂b
m
S )− vB(pmB )
]
.
Thus Δ < 0 ⇔ vS (̂bmS ) > vB(pmB ), and the proof of Proposition 11i) is complete.
To establish 11ii) it suffices to notice that vS
(
b̂mS
)
= E
(
bS |̂bmS
)
− pmS + vB (pmB ).
Part iii) results from the comparison of formulas (23) and (26).
Appendix 6: Elastic demand for the retail good
This appendix extends Proposition 2 to the case where final demand is elastic. In a
symmetric equilibrium where all retailers accept cards and charge the same retail price
p, this demand is a decreasing function D(p̂) of the “hedonic” price p̂ that incorporates
expected transaction costs, and is defined by:
p̂ ≡ p + E
[
min
(
b˜B, pB
)]
.
Retailers’ profit equals
RP = [p− γ − (pS − bS)DB (pB)]D (p̂) ,
or:
RP = (p̂− γ − E (bB)− bS − φ (pB))D (p̂) , (40)
where
φ (pB) =
∫ ∞
pB
(bB + bS − c−m) dH (BB) .
Given formula (40), the equilibrium hedonic price is a function of φ (pB) denoted p̂(φ),
that we can reasonably assume to be decreasing. Similarly we can write the equilibrium
value of retailers’ profit and consumer surplus as RP (φ) and CS(φ). It is legitimate
to assume that both RP and CS are increasing functions of φ. Thus, like in the case
of inelastic demand, the value of pB that maximizes consumer surplus is the one that
maximizes φ, that is pTUSB = c− bS +m (in the case where issuers’ margin m is constant).
The second part of Proposition 2 (namely 2ii)) can therefore be extended to elastic retail
demand. The first part is more difficult to generalize. Indeed, social welfare equals:
W (pB) = CS (φ(pB)) + RP (φ(pB)) + mDB(pB)D (p̂(φ)) .
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Thus
W ′(pB) = φ′(pB) [CS ′(φ) + RP ′(φ) + mDB(pB)D′(p̂)p̂′(φ)] + mD′B(pB)D(p̂).
We have assumed that p̂′ < 0, CS ′ > 0 and RP ′ > 0. Therefore the term in brackets is
positive. If W is quasi-concave in pB, this implies that the socially optimal buyer price
pWB is lower than p
T
B, that maximizes φ:
W ′
(
pTB
)
= mD′B
(
pTB
)
D(p̂) < 0 = W ′
(
pWB
)
.
Therefore, we have established:
Proposition 2 bis. When retail demand is elastic (and issuers’ margin constant):
i) The interchange fee aW that maximizes social welfare is higher than the tourist test
threshold aT ,
ii) the interchange fee aTUS that maximizes total user surplus is equal to aT .
Thus, the results of Proposition 2 are also valid when retail demand is elastic.
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